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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

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INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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E.O. 12356: N/A

PAGE: ETRD, EATD, PREL, UR, AF

SUBJECT: 1987 SOVIET-AFGHAN DIRECT ASSISTANCE TRADE AND
AID ACCORDS

REF: 87 KABUL 0921

1. SUMMARY: IN MID-1987 THE KABUL REGIME AND SOVIET
UNION MADE PUBLIC A POLICY OF DIRECT ASSISTANCE BETWEEN
AFGHAN PROVINCES AND SOVIET REPUBLICS AND PROVINCES THAT
IN FACT HAD BEGUN ON A LIMITED BASIS IN 1983. DIRECT AID
PROTOCOLS BETWEEN AFGHAN PROVINCES AND SOVIET REPUBLICS
MINIMIZE INVOLVEMENT BY KABUL REGIME CENTRAL AUTHORITIES
IN ADMINISTERING SOVIET ASSISTANCE. CORRUPTION, WASTE,
AND MISUSE, PROBLEMS THAT HAVE BEEN RIFE IN THE
DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET AND OTHER EAST BLOC AID HAVE LED
THE SOVIETS TO GO IT ALONE. THE SOVIETS HAVE RECOGNIZED
THAT THEY MUST NOW TAKE A DIRECT HAND IN BOTH PLANNING
AND IMPLEMENTING ASSISTANCE EFFORTS EVEN AT THE
PROVINCIAL LEVEL. BY PUBLICIZING THESE PROTOCOLS, THE

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SOVIETS ARE PUTTING A POSITIVE FACE ON WHAT IS ACTUALLY A
SOVIET FAILURE AFTER NINE YEARS TO ENFORCE EFFECTIVE,

RESPONSIBLE DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET AID BY THEIR AFGHAN
CLIENTS. THESE PROTOCOLS WHEN AND IF IMPLEMENTED, WOULD
BIND MORE TIGHTLY THE AFGHAN ECONOMY TO THE SOVIET
ECONOMY. SHOULD THE SOVIET MILITARY WITHDRAW FROM
AFGHANISTAN, THESE ARRANGEMENTS IF ENFORCED, WOULD INSURE
THAT FOR YEARS THE AFGHAN ECONOMY WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY
THE SOVIET UNION. THESE ARRANGEMENTS SIGNAL A NEW AND
DEEPER SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHAN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL AFFAIRS AT THE TIME WHEN THE SOVIETS ARE
ORDERING THEMSELVES AS ON THE VERGE OF WITHDRAWING FROM
AFGHANISTAN. END SUMMARY.

DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AID PROGRAMS TO AFGHANISTAN
1987: DURING 1987 REGIME AND SOVIET MEDIA ANNOUNCED

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GNING OF DOZENS OF PROTOCOLS BETWEEN THE SOVIET
AND EAST BLOC AND THE KABUL REGIME. THESE
ENTS COVERED THE GAMUT OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL,
AL AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. SOVIET AID TO
ESTAN DATES BACK TO THE 1920S BUT BEGAN IN EARNIST
MID-1950S WITH WHAT WERE AT THE TIME MASSIVE
RY AND NON-MILITARY PROGRAMS. SINCE THE 1978 COUP
ANCE FROM NON-EAST BLOC COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL
ZATIONS HAS ENDED EXCEPT FOR LIMITED UN PROGRAMS
SMALL, BUT EXPANDING INDIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.
JOE DEVELOPMENT DURING 1987 WAS THE PUBLIC EMPHASIS
ING MID-YEAR ON PROTOCOLS BETWEEN AFGHAN PROVINCES
MPARABLE ENTITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION. REGIME
HAVE DESCRIBED THIS AS "PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT
TION IN THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES,
ALLY FROM THE SOCIAL POINT OF VIEW." IN FACT IT

S THE FAILURE BY THE SOVIETS TO INDUCE THEIR AFGHAN
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S TO USE AND DISTRIBUTE SOVIET ASSISTANCE
IVELY.

IRST DIRECT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CENTRAL ASIAN
CS AND NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN: THE FIRST DIRECT
ANCE PROTOCOL WAS SIGNED IN 1983, BUT WAS NOT GIVEN
MEDIA PLAY. IN LATE 1986 KABUL MEDIA ANNOUNCED NEW
ASSISTANCE PROTOCOLS HAD BEEN SIGNED BETWEEN
CN AFGHAN PROVINCES AND SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN
CS. THESE 1986 ACCORDS REPORTEDLY WERE LIMITED IN
GO EXPEDITING COMMENCE ACROSS THE SOVIET-AFGHAN
FY ELIMINATING THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE AFGHAN
AUTHORITIES LOCATED HUNDREDS OF MILES AWAY AND
ED BY UNRELIABLE AND INSECURE TRANSPORT AND
CATION LINKS.

VIETS BEAME FAILED AID PROGRAMS ON AFGHAN
ION AND INCOMPETENCE: FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT
REGIME "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION" POLICY IN LATE
HE SOVIETS LAUNCHED A LARGE-SCALE PROGRAM TO
UTE GRATIS AID TO RURAL AFGHANS. AFGHAN MEDIA
SOVIET PEACE CONVOYS TRAVELLING FROM THE SOVIET-
FORDER BEARING FOODSTUFFS, BLANKETS, BOOTS, COOK
AND SIMILAR ITEMS. THESE GOODS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY
UTED BY AFGHANS, MILITARY AND PARTY CADRE IN

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1. ETRD, EARD, PREL, UR, AF

FACT: 1987 SOVIET-AFGHAN DIRECT ASSISTANCE TRADE AND
CORRUPT AND INEPT AFGHAN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT CADRE IN
PROVINCES WHO DID NOT DISTRIBUTE THE AID FAIRLY, SOLD
FOR THEIR PERSONAL BENEFIT, OR DISTRIBUTED IT TO THEIR
TIVES. PDPA GENERAL SECRETARY NAJIBULLAH AND PRIME
MINISTER KESHTMAND IN NUMEROUS SPEECHES COMPLAINED THAT
AFGHANS HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY APPRECIATIVE OF SOVIET
STANCE AND THAT IN-UD, CORRUPTION AND MISMANAGEMENT
LIMITED ITS EFFECTIVENESS. IN RECENT MONTHS SOVIET
A AND EAST BLOC DIPLOMATS IN KABUL HAVE VOLUNTEERED
STING CRITICISMS OF THE KABUL REGIME FOR ITS MISUSE AND
WASTE OF SOVIET AID.

NEW DIRECT COOPERATION PROTOCOLS SIGNED IN MID-1987:

OWING THE LURRY OF PUBLICITY ATTENDING THE
DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET "GRATIS AID" AND THE FOLLOW-UP
INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE CORRUPTION AND WASTE OF THAT AID,

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SUBJECT: DIRECT COOPERATION PROTOCOL SIGNINGS WERE

ANNOUNCED IN JULY AND AUGUST 1987. BY MID-SEPTEMBER
AFGHAN MEDIA PROCLAIMED THAT, "NOW EACH OF THE 29
PROVINCES OF AFGHANISTAN AND KHOST DIVISION (A MAJOR
ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT IN PAKTIA PROVINCE) HAS DIRECT TREATY
RELATIONS WITH ONE OR ANOTHER REPUBLIC OR REGION OF THE
SOVIET UNION." IN OCTOBER 1987, THE KABUL REGIME
ANNOUNCED THAT SAYED EREM FAICHA, A MINISTER OF STATE
AFFAIRS, HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR "DIRECT COOPERATIVE
RELATIONS." FAICHA IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE PDPA CENTRAL
COMMITTEE AUDITING COMMISSION WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
FIGHTING OUT CORRUPTION AND FRAUD WITHIN THE PARTY AND
GOVERNMENT. THIS APPOINTMENT FURTHER SUGGESTS THAT
THE GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED ABOUT CORRUPTION FIGURED IN THE SHIFT TO DIRECT
COOPERATION AGREEMENTS.

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6. KABUL REGIME EXPLANATIONS FOR THE NEW AGREEMENTS: REGIME MEDIA HAVE ADMITTED PROBLEMS WITH THEIR FOREIGN AID USE AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS, PARTICULARLY ECHOING NAJIBULLAH'S oft-stated complaint that provincial development has lagged and that party and government cadres refuse to venture out of Kabul city. A "KABUL NEW TIMES" (THE REGIME'S ENGLISH-LANGUAGE DAILY) ARTICLE WHICH DESCRIBES THE DIRECT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM BLAMES THE FAILURE TO WIN RURAL SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME ON KABUL OFFICIALS WHO DO NOT UNDERSTAND CONDITIONS IN THE PROVINCES: "IT IS . . . NOT A SECRET THAT NOT ALWAYS THESE (CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION) PRIORITIES ARE BASED ON DEEP UNDERSTANDING OF THE REAL NEEDS OF ONE OR ANOTHER PROVINCE." DIRECT COOPERATION AIMS TO CUT OUT THE NON-RESPONSIVE, ILL-INFORMED CENTRAL AUTHORITIES FROM THE PROCESS. THE ARTICLE GOES ON THAT "FROM THE CHAIN OF

LINKS, IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, THE INTERMEDIARY LINK IS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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EXCLUDED WHICH AT TIMES DUE TO DIFFERENT REASONS, IN NOT RESPONSIVE ENOUGH TO THE NEEDS OF THE PROVINCES.

7. REGIME DESCRIPTIONS OF SOVIET-AFGHAN DIRECT COOPERATION EFFORTS: THE KABUL REGIME STRESSES THE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CHARACTER OF THE EXCHANGES AND THE MUTUAL BENEFIT FOR BOTH SIDES: THE AGREEMENTS "ENVISAGE THE EXCHANGE OF DELEGATIONS AND GROUPS OF SOCIAL FIGURES, EXPERTS, REPRESENTATIVES OF DIFFERENT STRATA OF THE POPULATION; LINKS BETWEEN THE WORKING COLLECTIVES OF ENTERPRISES AND ORGANIZATIONS, DISPATCH OF SOVIET SPECIALISTS IN THE FIELDS OF MEDICINE, EDUCATION, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, ADMISSION OF MORE YOUTH FROM THE PROVINCES TO EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, COOPERATION OF MASS MEDIA AIMED AT MUTUALLY ACQUAINTING THE POPULATIONS WITH THE TRADITIONS AND THE PRESENT-DAY LIFE OF THE FRATERNAL PEOPLES. GIVEN ARE NOT ONLY CONSUMER GOODS, BUT ALSO MACHINERY FOR ROAD AND BUILDING CONSTRUCTION, FOR DRILLING WATER WELLS AND GENERATING ELECTRIC POWER, FOR LOADING AND TRANSPORTING, EQUIPMENT FOR WORKSHOPS AND SMALL ENTERPRISES, AND FOR MEDICAL ESTABLISHMENTS."

8. SCOPE OF THE PROTOCOLS: THE EXACT NUMBER AND DETAILS OF THE PROTOCOLS ARE UNKNOWN SINCE KABUL MEDIA OFTEN ONLY MAKE OBLIQUE REFERENCES TO THEM AND THE TEXTS OF THE PROTOCOLS ARE NOT AVAILABLE. AT LEAST 25 OF THESE PROTOCOLS WERE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED IN 1987. THEY COVER FIELDS OF EDUCATION, PUBLIC HEALTH, TRAINING OF PROFESSIONAL CADRES, REHABILITATION OF SCHOOLS AND SUPPLY OF MACHINES, POWER GENERATION, SPORTS AND CULTURE. MOST ARE SIGNED BETWEEN A SOVIET PROVINCE (OBLAST) AND AN AFGHAN PROVINCE ALTHOUGH SEVERAL ARE APPARENTLY BETWEEN A SOVIET REPUBLIC AND AN AFGHAN PROVINCE. THE CITIES OF

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: ITRD, RAID, PREL, UR, AF

SUBJECT: 1987 SOVIET-AFGHAN DIRECT ASSISTANCE TRADE AND
KABUL AND KANDAHAR HAVE ESTABLISHED CITY-TO-CITY
AGREEMENTS WITH MOSCOW AND ALMA ATA RESPECTIVELY. IN
ADDITION, A FEW PROTOCOLS HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED BETWEEN
UNIONS, SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTES.
A TYPICAL PROTOCOL IS THAT SIGNED BY AZERBAIJAN AND
PAKTIKA PROVINCE, A REMOTE, SPARSELY POPULATED AREA IN
SOUTHEAST AFGHANISTAN WITH NO URBAN CENTERS AND LITTLE
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT. IT REPORTEDLY INCLUDES THE
GIFT OF MATERIALS TOTALING 2 MILLION RUBLES DURING 1987-
88, ASSISTANCE IN PLANNING AND EQUIPPING OF A 200-PUPIL
BOARDING SCHOOL, ASSISTANCE IN PLANNING AND EQUIPPING
FURNITURE WORKSHOPS, ASSISTANCE IN DRILLING WELLS,
SETTING UP OF A SHOP NAMED "FRIENDSHIP" FOR SELLING
AZERBAIJANIAN GOODS. IT ALSO PROPOSES TO STUDY THE
POSSIBILITIES OF DELIVERING PAKTIKA PRODUCE TO
AZERBAIJAN. GOODS GIVEN TO THE PROVINCE INCLUDE

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TRANSPORT, WELL DRILLING MACHINERY, PRE-FABRICATED

BUILDINGS AND AIRCRAFT HANGARS, CONSTRUCTION MACHINERY,
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, EQUIPMENT
FOR MEDICAL FACILITIES AND SCHOOLS.

9. PROTOCOLS SIGNED IN 1987: THE FOLLOWING LISTS
AFGHAN PROVINCES AND THE SOVIET COUNTERPARTS THAT
REPORTEDLY SIGNED AGREEMENTS DURING 1987. NOTE THE
EMPHASIS ON LINKS BETWEEN CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AND THE
NORTHERN AFGHAN PROVINCES.

NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN

BARAKHSHAN PROVINCE -- TADZHIK SSR

BADKHS PROVINCE -- MAKRAU PROVINCE, TURKMEN SSR

BAKHT PROVINCE -- SURKHAN DARYA PROVINCE, UZBEK SSR

VARIAH PROVINCE -- CHARJOD PROVINCE, TURKMEN SSR

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MURDOCH PROVINCE	INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE, TADZHIK SSR
TAKHAF PROVINCE	MOLAVI PROVINCE, TADZHIK SSR

- HAKHAN PROVINCE	CHENNAI SSR
- HAZAR PROVINCE	RUSSIAN REPUBLIC, USSR
- CHOR PROVINCE	ARMENIAN SSR
- KEROV PROVINCE	CHERKASSK PROVINCE, RSFSR
- KAFK PROVINCE	UKRAINE SSR
- KOGAR PROVINCE	ARMENIA SSR; KIRGHIZ SSR
- KARMAN PROVINCE	KHARKOV PROVINCE, UKRAINE SSR
- EASTERN AFGHANISTAN	
- KUMAR PROVINCE	MINSK PROVINCE, BELORUSSIAN SSR
- PAKIA PROVINCE	KIRGHIZ SSR; AZERBAIJAN
- KHOSI DAVSIDA	AZERBAIJAN
- AKKIA PROVINCE	AZERBAIJAN

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WESTERN AFGHANISTAN

FINROZ PROVINCE -- KHESON PROVINCE, UKRAINEAN SSR

10. SOVIET INTEREST TO BURE NORTHERN AFGHAN PROVINCES TO
SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS: THE SOVIET SPECIAL
INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN'S NORTHERN PROVINCES HAS ECONOMIC

AS WELL AS THE OBVIOUS DEFENSIVE BENEFITS. ECONOMICALLY, NATURAL GAS, WHICH REMAINS AFGHANISTAN'S MOST IMPORTANT EXPORT PRODUCT HAS BEEN SENT THROUGH PIPELINES TO THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE 1960S. OTHERWISE THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE COMMERCE BETWEEN REGIONS ON EITHER SIDE OF THE BORDER. THE EFFECT OF SIGNING PROTOCOLS COVERING A RANGE OF ISSUES BETWEEN CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AND THE NORTHERN AFGHAN PROVINCES EFFECTIVELY STRENGTHENS THE CROSS-BORDER ECONOMIC TIES WHILE WEAKENING THE WELL-ESTABLISHED NETWORKS, TRADE RELATIONS AND INTERDEPENDENCE AMONG NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN REGIONS AND OTHER PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. AFGHANISTAN'S RUDIMENTARY TRANSPORT SYSTEM AND THE LACK OF PROCESSING FACILITIES HAVE PREVENTED NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN FROM REALIZING ITS VAST AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL. THE NEW SOVIET-AFGHAN ARRANGEMENTS MAY LEAD TO AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES WHICH COMPLEMENTS THE ECONOMIES OF THE SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS. AFGHAN AGRICULTURE MAY SHIFT TO A GREATER PROPORTION OF CASH CROPS INCLUDING COTTON AND SUGAR BEETS WHICH CAN BE PROCESSED AT SOVIET PLANTS. THE NEW RELATIONS MAY ALSO PROMOTE PERMANENT MOVEMENT OF SURPLUS SOVIET AND AFGHANISTAN WORKERS TO RELATIVELY UNDER-POPULATED BORDERING AFGHANISTAN. ACCORDING TO AFGHANS FROM THE BORDER PROVINCES, SOME SOVIET CENTRAL ASIANS HAVE ALREADY MOVED INTO KANDELISHAN, THE LARGEST CITY IN THE BORDER.

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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: ETRD, EARD, PREL, UR, AF

SUBJECT: 1987 SOVIET-AFGHAN DIRECT ASSISTANCE TRADE AND
11. SOVIET RATIONALES FOR TURNING TO DIRECT COOPERATION:
THE SOVIET SHORT-TERM PURPOSE FOR DIRECT COOPERATION IS
POSSIBLY TO REALIZE A BETTER RETURN ON ITS ASSISTANCE TO
AFGHANISTAN, SPECIFICALLY TO BUILD SUPPORT IN THE
PROVINCES AND AMONG RURAL PEOPLES IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE
MILITARY SITUATION. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS PROBABLY
INCLUDE:

-- SOVIETS ABANDONMENT OF EFFORTS TO FORGE AN EFFECTIVE
AFGHAN ADMINISTRATION: GIVEN THE COMPLAINTS ABOUT SOVIET
AID BEING WASTED, DIVERTED AND NOT HAVING ITS DESIRED
EFFECT, THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE REALIZED THAT THE KABUL
REGIME LACKS THE POTENTIAL TO DISTRIBUTE EFFECTIVELY
SOVIET AID, AT LEAST AT THIS TIME. THE SOVIETS THEREFORE
MAY HAVE DECIDED TO DELIVER THE AID DIRECTLY FROM THE
SOVIET UNION INSTEAD OF ROUTING IT PHYSICALLY OR

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ADMINISTRATIVELY THROUGH THE KABUL REGIME.

-- THE PROTOCOLS REASSURE NERVOUS CADRE THAT THE SOVIETS

ARE IN AFGHANISTAN TO STAY: AS SOVIET PROPAGANDA
INCREASINGLY SPEAKS OF A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, SKITTISH
AFGHAN CADRE MAY SEEK ASSURANCES THAT A SOVIET PRESENCE
WILL CONTINUE AFTER THE MILITARY LEAVES AND THAT SOVIETS
WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT LEVERAGE OVER THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT
TO ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF SOVIET CLIENTS.

-- SOVIETS INTEND TO MAKE AFGHANISTAN SO DEPENDENT ON IT
THAT NO FUTURE AFGHAN REGIME WILL BE ABLE TO RESIST
SOVIET DICTATES: SHOULD THE SOVIET MILITARY WITHDRAW,
OBLIGATIONS AND INDEBTEDNESS TO THE SOVIETS WILL BE SO
GREAT THAT NO AFGHAN REGIME COULD DISREGARD SOVIET
WISHES. GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY GUARANTEES THAT NO AFGHAN
REGIME COULD RENOUNCE THE OBLIGATIONS INCURRED BY PDPA

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UPPER REGIMES TO THE SOVIET UNION.

SOVIETS PUNISH NARROW-MINDED POLICE. SOCIALLY, THE
POPULATIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE SOVIET-AFGHAN BORDER,
ARE ETHNICALLY THE SAME. MANY RESIDENTS IN NORTHERN
AFGHANISTAN ARE REFUGEES WHO FLED FROM CENTRAL ASIA
DURING THE 1920S AND 1930S. LIMITED VISITS BY AFGHANS TO
THEIR RELATIVES ACROSS THE BORDER HAD BEEN ALLOWED BEFORE
1978 AND MAY HAVE BEEN PERMITTED SINCE. AFTER THE 1978
Soviet efforts to cultivate support among these
populations of north Afghanistan have followed the
"divide and rule" tactics of the Soviet
nationalities policy. Soviet-written Afghan textbooks,
newspapers, books and radio programs have all stressed
Afghan ethnic identities paralleling the Soviet
distinctions between Uzbeks, Turkmen, Tadzhiks and the

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EEK. GIVEN THE RELATIVELY HIGHER MATERIAL LIVING
CONDITIONS IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA, THE SOVIETS MAY
BELIEVE THAT INCREASED CONTACT BETWEEN AFGHANS AND THEIR
ETHNIC COUNTERPARTS IN CENTRAL ASIA WILL WIN GREATER
AFGHAN SUPPORT FOR SOVIET AND PDPA POLICIES. THIS IS A
HIGH RISK POLICY BECAUSE THE SOVIETS SEEK TO INFLUENCE
IF AFGHANS WHILE AVOIDING THE SPREAD TO THEIR CENTRAL
ASIAN POPULATIONS OF ISLAMIC SENTIMENTS AND ISLAMIC-
SPIRED OPPOSITION TO SLAVIC POLITICAL DOMINATION IN
CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS.

DIRECT COOPERATION WILL NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEMS
PERTAINING TO THE FAILURE OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO WIN
SUPPORT FOR THE PDPA. THE WASTE, CORRUPTION AND
INEFFECTIVENESS OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN WILL
NOT BE RESOLVED THROUGH THIS SCHEME FOR THE FOLLOWING
REASONS:

SOVIETS WILL NOT ALLOW PROVINCE-TO-PROVINCE OR
PROVINCE-TO-REPUBLIC ASSISTANCE WITHOUT FIRM CONTROL BY
THEIR CENTRAL AUTHORITIES. APPEARANCES NOTWITHSTANDING
DIRECT COOPERATION PROTOCOLS WILL NOT RESULT IN
REAL LINKS. EVEN IF SOVIET PROVINCES DID EXERCISE
CONTROL OVER THEIR SIDE OF THE AGREEMENTS, AFGHAN
GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES ARE INCAPABLE OF ADMINISTERING
SUCH PROGRAMS. THE TYPES OF FRAUD AND CORRUPTION WHICH
AGGRAVATE THE CENTRALLY ADMINISTERED AID PROGRAMS WOULD BE
EVEN GREATER IN SUCH DIRECT COOPERATION ACTIVITIES
BECAUSE THE AFGHANS CHARGED WITH MONITORING AND
ENFORCING LOCAL OFFICIALS ARE HUNDREDS OF MILES AWAY IN
AFGHANISTAN. FURTHERMORE, THE RECENT TENDENCY TO APPOINT
LOCAL FIGURES, INCLUDING FORMER MUJAHIDIN
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TAGS: ITRD, RAID, PREL, UR, AF
SUBJECT: 1987 SOVIET-AFGHAN DIRECT ASSISTANCE TRADE AND
COMMANDERS, TO ADMINISTER THEIR NATIVE PROVINCES AND
DISTRICTS IN AN EFFORT TO FOSTER THE APPEARANCE OF
INDIRECT RULE CREATES A SITUATION RIPE FOR FRAUD AND
CORRUPTION. EVEN BEFORE 1978 WHEN THE PROVINCIAL AND
DISTRICT BUREAUCRATS HAD SOME PROFESSIONAL SKILLS,
CENTRAL AUTHORITIES EXERCISED TIGHT CONTROL OVER THEM,
AND THERE WAS A STRICT POLICY OF NEVER ASSIGNING ANY
ADMINISTRATOR (#)
PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATORS WERE NOT ENTRUSTED TO
ADMINISTER AID. NOTHING SUGGESTS THAT THE HIGHLY
CENTRALIZED AFGHAN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE HAS CHANGED
TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE (#)

THAT IT WAS
PROVINCIAL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO WERE
IMPLICATED IN THE SCANDALS INVOLVING FRAUD AND WASTE OF
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SOVIET GRATIS AID IN 1987.
SECURITY PROBLEMS IN PROVINCES: SECURITY IN THE
PROVINCES IS SO POOR THAT IT IS NOT REALISTIC TO CONSIDER

UNdertaking ASSISTANCE PROJECTS THERE THAT REQUIRE A
CONTINUED PRESENCE OF PERSONNEL. THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS HAVE RESTRICTED
THEIR STAFF TO KABUL BECAUSE OF SECURITY CONCERNS
ELSEWHERE IN AFGHANISTAN, EVEN IN THE REASONABLY SECURE
CITIES OF MAZAR-I SHARIF AND HERAT. WHILE SOVIET EXPERTS
AND TECHNICIANS CAN RELY ON SOVIET MILITARY SECURITY IN THE
PROVINCES, THEIR INEVITABLE PRE-OCCUPATION WITH SECURITY
WILL PLAY HAVOC WITH ORGANIZING EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS.

AFGHAN CADRE REFUSE TO WORK OUTSIDE OF KABUL. IN THE
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KABUL HAS REPEATEDLY PROMISED TO GET PARTY
OF KIDNAPING THE PROVINCES. THE RISKS ARE
SIDE OF SEVERE MARCH PROVINCIAL ASSIGNMENTS
DUE AT BEST. THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO PROVIDE
AND THE PROFESSIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND
PERSONNEL FOR THESE PROJECTS. THEY WILL FIND
AFGHANS WILLING TO WORK IN THEIR PROVINCIAL
OFFICES.

THEY ARE INCAPABLE OF ABSORBING ASSISTANCE. EVEN
TOWNS UNDER NOMINAL REGIME CONTROL THE
PUBLIC SERVICES. ELECTRICITY, WATER, ROAD
CARE, HEALTH CARE, ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS, COLLECTION
AND FEES ARE NOT BEING PROVIDED. IF PROVINCIAL
CANNOT PERFORM AT THIS MOST BASIC LEVEL THEN
TIAL FOR THE PROVINCES TO ABSORB THE BENEFITS OF
DIRECT COOPERATION AGREEMENT (#) BUILDING A
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HOSPITAL OR WORKSHOP IS OF LITTLE (#)

RICITY CANNOT BE PROVIDED, AND STAFF, EQUIPMENT,
AND SKILLS TO OPERATE THE FACILITY ARE
LACKING.

EFFORTS TO USE THEIR ASSISTANCE TO WIN FRIENDS
AND THE PDPA ARE BASED ON SIMPLISTIC ASSUMPTIONS
CAN BE DIRECTLY TRANSLATED INTO POLITICAL
AFGHAN RECIPIENTS ARE NOT OBVIOUS TO THE
US BEHIND THE SOVIET EFFORTS AND ARE UNLIKELY TO
BY HANDOUTS.

CONCLUSION: NO DOUBT IN MANY CASES SOME AID THAT IS
IN THESE PROTOCOLS WILL BE DELIVERED, BUT MOST
UNDER SOVIET SUPERVISION AND DIRECTION. AS WITH
PREVIOUS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS THERE WILL BE LITTLE
AFGHAN FOLLOW-THROUGH OR BUILDING ON WHAT THEY
GIVEN. DECENTRALIZING SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO
LOCAL LEVELS (#)

EXPERIENCE, AND COMMON
LAST YEAR THE PROBLEMS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF
THE AID WERE BASED ON PROVINCIAL
TENSIONS AND PARTY CADRE. THESE WERE NOT ISOLATED
AFGHAN FAILURES TO PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH A
VIEW ON THEIR INVESTMENT HAVE BECOME A COMMON
BOTH LOCAL AND SOVIET MEDIA. ADMINISTRATIVE
ZARIF WOULD BEING A NIGHTMARE (#)

DELEGATION, BURDENING OF REPORTS,
ACTION PROBLEMS, AND JEALOUS EFFORTS BY
OFFICIALS TO CORRAL MORE RESOURCES TO MEET
S WITHOUT REGARD FOR BROADER NATIONAL
THAT SUCH A MOVE MAKES NO SENSE AND GOES
TO SOVIET INSTITUTIONAL (#)

SUGGESTS THAT THE HURRY OF DIRECT COOPERATION
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PROTOCOLS ARE GUIDED BY (#)

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EMBASSY KABUL

ECSTATE WASHDC 7841

EMBASSY ISLAMABAD

EMBASSY NEW DELHI

EMBASSY PESHAWAR

EMBASSY MOSCOW

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12356: N/A

1. ETRD, ERID, PREL, UR, AF

ECT: 1987 SOVIET-AFGHAN DIRECT ASSISTANCE TRADE AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THESE ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOT AIMED AT ENSURING DIRECT COOPERATION BETWEEN PROVINCES BUT ONLY ARE A MASK TO HIDE THE SOVIET FAILURE TO WORK THROUGH CLIENTS. THE SOVIETS HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THEY MUST TAKE A DIRECT HAND IN BOTH PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING ASSISTANCE EFFORTS EVEN AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL. THIS IS A NEW AND GREATER SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHAN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS AT THE TIME WHEN SOVIETS (#)

FROM AFGHANZAN.

MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MCWILLIAMS

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